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ABSTRACT: For the past 10 years, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) has operated as an independent overseer of public company audits. Over 70 percent of 
PCAOB studies have been published since 2010, evidencing the increasing relevance of 
PCAOB-related research in recent years. Our paper reviews the existing literature on the 
PCAOB’s four primary functions – Registration, Standard-Setting, Inspections, and 
Enforcement. In particular, we examine PCAOB registration trends and evaluate the effects of 
PCAOB registration requirements on the issuer audit market, as well as discuss the relative costs 
and benefits (e.g., auditor behavior changes, improvements in audit quality, auditor perceptions) 
of the 16 auditing standards the PCAOB passed in its first 10 years of operation. Further, we 
summarize the literature’s findings on the effects of the PCAOB inspection process on various 
facets of audit quality. Finally, we analyze the research concerning the PCAOB’s enforcement 
actions to determine how markets have responded to sanctions against auditors and audit firms. 
We contend that understanding and reviewing the effects of the PCAOB’s activities are 
important to future audit research because of the PCAOB’s authority over and oversight of the 
issuer audit profession. We also identify PCAOB-related research areas that have not been fully 
explored and propose several research questions intended to address these research areas. 
 
 
Keywords: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), Registration, Standard-
setting, Inspection, Enforcement 
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A Summary of 10 Years of PCAOB Research: What Have We Learned? 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
On January 6, 2003, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) opened 
its Washington, D.C. office; three days later, the PCAOB held its first open board meeting, 
ending more than 100 years of self-regulation at the federal level by the public company audit 
profession [PCAOB 2013c; Ernst & Young 2012]. The PCAOB had been established six months 
earlier with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) to protect the interests of investors and 
further the public confidence in the preparation of informative, accurate and independent audit 
reports [U.S. House of Representatives 2002]. Researchers, regulators, and practitioners have 
tried to understand the influence of the PCAOB for over a decade. For example, what impact has 
the PCAOB inspection process had on the auditing profession and audit quality? How have 
markets reacted to information disseminated by the PCAOB? How have PCAOB standards 
influenced auditor behavior? Accordingly, the objective of our paper is to review prior studies 
related to the four primary functions of the PCAOB (i.e., registration, standard-setting, 
inspections, and enforcement), synthesize the extant findings, and suggest directions for future 
research to address unanswered questions. 
Over 70 percent of PCAOB studies have been published since 2010, evidencing the 
increasing relevance of PCAOB-related research in recent years. It is likely that in coming years, 
PCAOB research will continue to grow and broaden as data on each of the functions of the 
PCAOB become more available. The possibility exists that, as we learn more about the influence 
of the PCAOB, many prior conceptions in academic research about the role of auditors, auditors’ 
obligations to their clients, and auditors’ responses to external scrutiny may warrant 
reinvestigation or further exploration. While the breadth of the PCAOB research is fairly diverse, 
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we did identify some common themes. First, the research has concluded that PCAOB regulation 
drove many small audit firms out of the issuer audit market [DeFond and Lennox 2011; Read et 
al. 2004].1 However, this does not necessarily imply that auditor exits from the issuer audit 
market were detrimental, as the auditors that remained appeared to be more independent, of 
higher quality, and less likely to be the target of PCAOB enforcement actions than the exiting 
auditors [DeFond and Lennox 2011].  
Second, several papers have highlighted the costs and benefits of the PCAOB standard-
setting activities (e.g., Smith [2012]; Wang and Zhou [2012]). For example, while some research 
supports AS3’s increased focus on documentation (e.g., Payne and Ramsay [2008]), other 
research (e.g., Piercey [2011]) highlight unintended, adverse effects on auditor judgments (e.g., 
more lenient judgments).  
Third, while some research questions the efficacy of the inspection process (e.g., Lennox 
and Pittman [2010], Glover et al. [2009]), several studies have contributed empirical evidence to 
support the position that the PCAOB inspection process has been beneficial to the auditing 
profession (e.g., Offermanns and Peek [2011], DeFond [2010]). Specifically, the extant literature 
contends the market penalizes audit firms for receiving inspection reports containing PCAOB-
identified deficiencies [Daugherty et al. 2011] and, over time, the inspection process has 
appeared to lead to improved audit quality (e.g., Gramling et al. [2011], Landis et al. [2011]).  
Fourth, enforcement actions and subsequent penalties borne by auditors that remained in 
the issuer audit market appeared to be relatively more severe for smaller audit firms [Gilbertson 
and Herron 2009]. However, enforcement actions levied against firms of all sizes resulted in 
                                                 
1 The PCAOB defines a small audit firm as an audit firm that regularly audits 100 or fewer issuers each year; these 
firms are inspected triennially.  
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negative repercussions to both auditors (e.g., auditor retention) and to audit clients [Dee et al. 
2011].  
Understanding and reviewing the effects of the PCAOB is important to future research 
because of the PCAOB’s authority over the audit profession. The effects of the PCAOB’s 
decisions can have far-reaching implications on how audits are conducted, the pricing of audits, 
the auditor/client relationship, the consequences of audit failure, and the public’s confidence in 
the auditing profession. As the PCAOB’s activities have increased in recent years (e.g., increased 
standard-setting docket, expanded inspection programs into dealer-broker audits), it is likely that 
the PCAOB will continue to affect the auditing profession in the coming years. Our review 
provides a foundation for future research by synthesizing and categorizing this emerging body of 
research, as well as discussing future research opportunities. We structure our review around a 
framework that is based on the four primary functions of the PCAOB (see Figure 1). That is, we 
categorize each paper into one or more of the following functional categories – registration, 
standard-setting, inspection, or enforcement.  We examined PCAOB-related literature from the 
past 10 years by searching ABI Inform and Business Source Premier for academic papers 
containing the following keywords: PCAOB, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 
auditing standard, inspection, and enforcement. Additionally, we consulted the reference section 
of each paper reviewed to detect studies not identified during the initial search. While we 
focused on research that has been published in accounting research journals for the purpose of 
our review, we also reviewed a number of papers currently in progress and pending review.2 
[Please insert Figure 1 here] 
                                                 
2 While our paper’s aim is to synthesize PCAOB-related research over the past decade, it is worth noting that 
reviews by Schneider et al. [2009] and Asare et al. [2013] both provide reviews of the ICFR literature. While we 
summarize the findings of these two reviews, our review will focus on studies not covered in either of the two 
previous reviews. 
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2.0 REGISTRATION 
SOX [U.S. House of Representatives 2002], Section 102, states it shall be “unlawful for 
any person that is not a registered public accounting firm to prepare or issue, or to participate in 
the preparation or issuance of, any audit report with respect to any issuer.” Registration subjects 
each firm to the oversight activities assigned to the PCAOB for the protection of investors 
[PCAOB 2012a]. The registration process allows the PCAOB to recognize a firm as meeting the 
minimum requirements to audit public issuers (though the registration process does not bear with 
it any assurance of audit quality), as well as requires periodic reporting from registered firms 
[PCAOB 2010a]. The periodic reporting requirements (1) keep the PCAOB informed of basic 
demographic changes in the firm and its members, (2) reflect the extent and nature of the firm’s 
audit practice related to issuers, and (3) inform the PCAOB of any circumstances that merit 
follow-up through the PCAOB’s inspection process [PCAOB 2012a].  
Registration and reporting with the PCAOB is a relatively simple process that requires 
firms to complete two forms.3 The PCAOB provides detailed instructions to prospective audit 
firms on how to prepare Form 1: Application for Registration [PCAOB 2010a]. Applicant firms 
pay a one-time registration fee based on the number of issuer audit clients they engaged in the 
preceding year. Following registration approval, registered firms are required to submit Form 2: 
Annual Report on a yearly basis; detailing the activities and services provided by the firm to its 
issuer clients. Similar to the registration fee, firms pay an annual reporting fee based on the 
number of issuer clients from the preceding year [PCAOB 2011b].  
                                                 
3 There are technically five forms, however, three of the forms are required by the PCAOB only in special cases. 
Form 3 – Special Report is generally required when a firm audits an issuer client that has had prior compliance 
issues or has been engaged in ongoing legal proceedings. Form 4 – Succeeding to Registration Status of Predecessor 
is used in rare situations where a registered firm merges with or is acquired by a non-registered firm. Finally Form 
1-WD: Request to Withdraw from Registration is required only when a firm wishes to deregister from the PCAOB.  
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Figure 2 provides the number of audit firms registered with the PCAOB from 2004-
2012.4 The first bar in each year is the number of US registrants; the second bar is the number of 
Non-US registrants; and the third bar is the total number of registrants. Of note is that the 
number of registered firms appears to significantly increase in 2009.  
[Please insert Figure 2 here] 
2.1 Registration Literature 
Despite the significance of the registration process, there is a paucity of academic 
literature regarding registration with the PCAOB. To date, we found only two academic papers 
on the subject of registration. Further, those two papers focus only on the causes of firm 
deregistration (presented in Table 1 below). Specifically, Read et al. [2004] investigated the 
effects SEC rule changes and PCAOB oversight following the passage of SOX; and provided 
empirical evidence about audit firms whose clients are limited to the immediate local area or 
region and changes in the market for SEC audits. They examined all Form 8-Ks associated with 
auditor resignations from 2000-2003. In 2002-2003, they identified 47 local and regional audit 
firms that were ceasing all SEC audits; while they identified only eight such firms in 2000-2001. 
Interviews with audit partners of local and regional firms provided evidence that the primary 
reasons for ceasing SEC audits were the perception of a more stringent oversight by the then 
recently created PCAOB, increased professional liability insurance costs, and increased scrutiny 
by the SEC. 
Read et al. [2004] also found that many local and regional audit firms with no SEC 
clients voluntarily registered with the PCAOB. Follow-up interviews with partners of these firms 
indicated that the reason for voluntary registration was to signal audit quality to non-SEC 
                                                 
4 All totals were taken from PCAOB Annual Reports from 2004-2012. 
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registered clients and other stakeholders of the firm.5 This suggests a perceived benefit to 
registration, even though registration with the PCAOB conveys no actual assurance of audit 
quality. 
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
 DeFond and Lennox [2011] extended Read et al.’s [2004] findings that PCAOB oversight 
influenced the likelihood that small firms (audit firms that regularly audit 100 or fewer issuers 
each year) would continue to audit public issuers. Specifically, DeFond and Lennox examined all 
small audit firm exits (i.e., a firm that stopped auditing SEC registrants and deregistered with the 
PCAOB) from 2001-2008. Their sample contained 1,233 small audit firms, of which 607 firms 
(49 percent) exited the market during the analysis period. Most (394 firms, 65 percent) exited the 
market shortly after the passage of SOX (i.e., 2002 to 2004). DeFond and Lennox contend that 
the exodus of these firms improved audit quality for issuers, as they were more likely to avoid 
AICPA peer reviews, fail to comply with PCAOB rules, and/or receive more severe peer review 
or inspection reports.  
2.1.1 Future Research Opportunities 
 Currently, both academic papers that investigated the registration process have focused 
on the determinants of deregistration. We believe that there are two primary areas of future 
research in the registration process. First, based on Read et al.’s [2004] finding that partners 
believe voluntary registration signals audit quality to non-SEC registered clients and other 
stakeholders of the firm, we believe that opportunities exist in understanding stakeholders’ 
perceived intrinsic value of PCAOB registration. For example, it would be beneficial to 
                                                 
5 Many firms registered with the Board perform no audit work for issuers, brokers, or dealers, and the Board does 
not inspect those firms [PCAOB 2012a]. 
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understand whether, for accounting firms with no issuer clients, PCAOB registration influences 
external stakeholder perceptions and judgments. Additionally, there may be some interest in 
exactly what type of signal PCAOB registration carries in the market. Second, we believe the 
periodic and special reporting requirements (e.g., a firm or partner becoming a defendant in a 
criminal proceeding) could contain valuable information. For example, is the relative frequency 
of instances in which a firm, or partner at the firm, is named as a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding (i.e., Form 3) associated with audit quality? Finally, as stated previously, there was a 
sharp increase in firm registrations in 2009. Are there identifiable environmental or exogenous 
factors that led to the increase in registrations in 2009? 
We propose the following research questions: 
RQ1 How does PCAOB registration affect external stakeholder perceptions? 
 
RQ2 Do non-public audit clients interpret PCAOB registration to be a signal of higher 
audit quality? 
 
RQ3 Do audit firms that routinely submit special reports to the PCAOB (i.e., Form 3) 
have higher/lower audit quality than firms that do not? 
 
RQ4 What led to the sharp increase in PCAOB registrations in 2009? 
 
 
3.0 STANDARD-SETTING 
SOX, Section 103, gives the PCAOB the authority to establish and modify audit 
standards for public companies, subject to SEC approval. In April 2003, the Board adopted 
mainly preexisting AICPA generally accepted auditing standards as its interim standards 
[PCAOB 2013c].6 The PCAOB has established 16 SEC-approved audit standards to date. Table 
                                                 
6 These interim standards can be superseded by any subsequently established PCAOB auditing standard (e.g., AS16 
superseding AU 310). 
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2, Panel A, presents a list of adopted auditing standards, while Panel B presents all current 
docket items related to releases and discussions on proposed standards.  
[Please insert Table 2 here] 
The PCAOB regularly monitors audit risks, challenges, and the prevailing economic 
environment when setting and modifying its standard-setting agenda [PCAOB 2012c]. The 
Board also takes into consideration (1) issues arising as a result of its oversight of registered 
public accounting firms (e.g., auditor’s reporting model, fair value measurements, quality 
control), (2) the continual need to improve interim audit standards adopted by the Board, and (3) 
input from its Standing Advisory Group (SAG), its Investor Advisory Group (IAG), and 
discussions with the SEC [PCAOB 2012c]. The Board also considers the activities of other 
standard-setting bodies, both domestic and international, along with current accounting research 
trends, emerging issues, and feedback solicited from the public [PCAOB 2012c]. Nevertheless, 
some contend that the PCAOB’s standard-setting process may be flawed and misguided [e.g., 
Glover et al. 2009].While many studies have investigated the effects of SOX on varying facets of 
the financial statement reporting process and financial statement quality (e.g. Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al. [2007], Doyle et al. [2007]), relatively few studies have focused on the effects of specific 
auditing standards enacted by the PCAOB. Our focus in this section is on studies that examined 
the effects of the PCAOB’s standard-setting activities (e.g., Auditing Standards Nos. 3, 7, etc.). 
The reviewed literature is summarized in Table 3. 
[Please insert Table 3 here] 
3.1 AS2 and AS5 - Internal Controls Evaluations and Assessments 
Section 404 of SOX mandated testing of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) 
by the external auditors. Post-SOX, the standards for conducting integrated ICFR financial 
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statement audits were established initially in AS2, and later superseded by AS5.7 A robust stream 
of literature has studied ICFR audits, AS2 and AS5, particularly in regards to the effects of these 
two standards on audit fees, audit delays, and the disclosure (in an audit opinion) of internal 
control deficiencies. These studies have largely been reviewed in one of two recent synthesis 
papers – Schneider et al. [2009] or Asare et al. [2013]. In an effort to not overlap these studies, 
our review focuses on papers not previously reviewed, and focuses on the key findings of papers 
published subsequently.  
Schneider et al. [2009] synthesized the literature as it related to characteristics of 
companies reporting ICFR deficiencies, and the effects of adverse ICFR reports on financial 
statement users and audit firms. Their review highlighted that increased auditor involvement in 
ICFR reporting was associated with increased detection and disclosure of internal control 
deficiencies (ICDs), and that the existence of a material weakness in ICFR was associated with 
longer audit delay. Schneider et al.’s review also found the extant literature indicated that 
auditors that issued adverse ICFR opinions were more likely to not be ratified by their clients, 
and that the implementation of required ICFR reports led to significant increases in audit fees.  
Asare et al. [2013] contended that the Board’s justification for issuing AS5 was to allow 
auditors to exercise more judgment and to focus auditors on the most important matters of the 
audit. Because Schneider et al.’s [2009] primary focus was not auditor decision making, Asare et 
al. [2013] synthesized (primarily) post-SOX studies that have focused on understanding and 
improving auditors’ ICFR decisions. Their review suggested that auditors have adjusted their 
methodology to apply the top-down risk-based approach emphasized in AS5, with an attendant 
decrease in cost to companies (compared to AS2). The authors’ review also found that auditors 
                                                 
7 For a detailed background of the evolution of ICFR auditing standards, please see Asare et al. [2013] 
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have difficulty assessing risk in complex accounting systems, might be overconfident in their 
risk assessments, but that proper documentation could improve auditor judgment.  
Since these two reviews, a handful of studies have furthered our understanding of AS2 
and AS5. For example, Bronson et al. [2011] examined delays in audit reporting under AS2 for 
26,731 firm-year observations from 2000-2005. Bronson et al. contended that the stringent 
testing requirements under AS2 (not solely companies with ICFR material weaknesses as 
Schneider et al. [2009] contended) resulted in auditors’ reports being released later than prior to 
AS2. Further, Bronson et al. examined the severity of this “audit report lag” following AS2, and 
whether this phenomenon was associated with reduced reliability in earnings announcements. 
They found that audit reports were issued 10 to 15 days later on average following AS2. Further, 
these delays in audit reporting appeared to be associated with more frequent revisions in earnings 
estimates by audit clients, indicating that preliminary earnings information post-AS2 was less 
reliable than it had been prior to the enactment of the standard. 
In an effort to evaluate whether efficiencies gained by AS5 came at a cost of decreased 
auditor risk assessment decision making, Mock et al. [2009], using the Dempster-Shafer theory 
of belief functions, developed a risk-based evidential reasoning approach for assessing the 
effectiveness of ICFR. The authors used this model to evaluate the risk assessment approach set 
forth in AS5 and determined the overall effectiveness of AS5 relative to the model standard. 
They found that the ICFR approach in the post-AS5 environment was quantitatively similar to 
the pre-AS5 approach; however, the cost savings realized under AS5 should lead to more 
efficient ICFR assessments overall. 
One way in which AS5 allowed auditors to exercise judgment and increase ICFR audit 
efficiency was to enable external auditor reliance on internal auditors when the internal audit 
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activities met certain criteria [PCAOB 2007]. Asare et al. [2013] suggested that while the 
PCAOB has emphasized that auditors can perform an efficient, integrated audit by leveraging the 
work of others, auditors must be cautious because client-provided documentation and 
assessments have the propensity to bias auditor assessments. Bame-Aldred et al.’s [2013] 
findings complement Asare et al.’s findings in that they proposed that the environment in which 
external auditors must make a reliance decision is complex—involving several factors that must 
be considered simultaneously. Moreover, the authors contend that an evolving set of auditing 
standards introduces several necessary intermediary judgments that the external auditors must 
process before, and during, reliance on the internal audit function. 
Similarly, Smith [2012] tested investors’ perception of the tradeoff between efficiencies 
gained by external auditors by relying on internal auditors and the negative effects on the 
perceptions of audit quality due to the increased reliance. Based on his survey of MBA students 
at a large public university, Smith examined how participants’ investment decisions varied based 
on changes in the audit testing environment (representing the actual transition from AS2 to AS5). 
Smith observed that participants under the AS5 condition were more likely to expect the changes 
in the auditing standard to reduce audit quality. Additionally, while the intention of the standard 
was to reduce overall costs, investors perceived this change as a reduction in internal controls’ 
effectiveness and efficiency. 
Finally, Wang and Zhou [2012], using 4,132 firm-year observations from 2008 as well as 
two matched control samples, examined audit fee changes following AS5. More importantly, the 
authors also investigated overall audit quality (measured using abnormal accruals and meet-or-
beat analysts' forecasts) pre- and post-AS5 to determine if there was any change in audit quality 
following the enactment of AS5. While they found results consistent with the aforementioned 
12 
 
studies (i.e. audit fees decreased noticeably between AS2 and AS5), the authors did not find any 
evidence of a corresponding decrease in audit quality. The authors cited their results as evidence 
that AS5 was successful in its objective of reducing ICFR testing requirements without 
sacrificing overall audit quality. 
3.1.1 Future Research Opportunities  
Given the significance of the change from AS2 to AS5, we believe there are opportunities 
for future research in this area. For example, it is possible that AS5 reversed some of the trends 
observed when AS2 was originally enacted. That is, both Lennox and Pittman [2010] and 
DeFond and Lennox [2011] observed auditor exits from the public audit market following the 
creation of the PCAOB – often citing increased oversight and compliance effort. Following the 
reduced testing requirements of AS5, have auditors who had previously exited the public audit 
market re-entered?  
We propose the following research question: 
RQ5 Did audit firms that deregistered from SEC audits following the passage of AS2 
reregister for SEC audits following the passage of AS5? 
 
3.2 AS3 - Audit Documentation and Associated Risk Assessment 
AS3 establishes general requirements for documentation that the auditor should prepare 
and retain in connection with engagements conducted pursuant to the standards of the PCAOB 
[PCAOB 2004]. Of note is that AS3 substantially increases auditors’ obligations to document 
their risk assessments [Piercey 2011], and requires audit firms to use more detailed audit 
workpapers and fewer summary memos to document their procedures [Payne and Ramsay 2008]. 
While not as widely examined as ICFR testing, two studies have investigated the positives and 
negatives of increased audit documentation requirements.  
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Payne and Ramsay [2008] explored the overall usefulness of expanded documentation 
requirements under AS3. Using an experimental setting, Payne and Ramsay [2008] examined the 
frequency and duration that auditors spent examining audit evidence based on whether detailed 
documentation was required, or if auditors could rely on summary memos to document their 
testing. While detailed documentation was associated with more extensive reviews of audit 
evidence, the use of summary memos was associated with more frequent references to the 
evidence. Further, the increased duration associated with detailed documentation appeared to 
lead to better error detection. However, the increased frequency associated with the use of 
summary memos resulted in better memory of the evidence. These results support the importance 
of the PCAOB’s focus on documentation, as well as the need for auditor self-review of prepared 
documentation. 
Piercey [2011] tested whether the “not documented, not done” condition placed on audit 
testing following AS3 improved auditor judgments. He found that increased audit documentation 
tended to be associated with more lenient auditor judgments. While the increased documentation 
requirements provided more detail regarding the audit evidence, this detail tended to be 
qualitative justification for the auditor’s position. Piercey [2011] contended that the PCAOB’s 
documentation requirements may have had unintended effects, with adverse implications for 
audit effectiveness contrary to the PCAOB’s regulatory intent. 
3.2.1 Future Research Opportunities  
Given the proprietary nature of audit documentation, archival investigations in this area 
would be difficult to accomplish without being granted access to firms’ workpapers. That being 
said, experimental investigations have the opportunity to investigate the effects of AS3 more 
readily. Specifically, are increased documentation requirements associated with higher 
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compliance costs (e.g., staffing decisions, budget for review time, audit pricing)? While a great 
deal of the effort involved in audit documentation rests with the auditors, the acquisition of this 
information may require more work on the part of the clients as well. What are the 
behavioral/relational effects of increased documentation requirements from a client perspective? 
Are the number of risks identified during an audit reduced in response to the enhanced 
documentation of these risks (either consciously or logistically because each risk requires so 
much documentation that resources are constrained)? Given the instances of documentation 
deficiencies identified by the PCAOB in its inspection process, can a better methodology be 
developed for auditors use when determining the sufficiency of documentation? 
Finally, given the 2013 disclosure of PricewaterhouseCooper’s 2009 and 2010 quality 
control issues (i.e., failure to perform sufficient procedures, or include in its work papers 
sufficient evidence, to support its opinion on ICFR or its controls-reliance strategy [PCAOB 
2010c]), the possibility exists that there will be an increased effort in ICFR documentation 
amongst firms to avoid PCAOB-identified deficiencies. Will increased documentation and effort 
requirements for reliance strategies mitigate AS5 efficiency gains? 
We propose the following research questions: 
RQ6 What is the relationship between increased documentation under AS3 and audit 
planning decisions? 
 
RQ7 Do clients perceive documentation requirements under AS3 differently than they did 
prior to AS3? 
 
RQ8 Does the quantification of risks under AS3 result in lower or higher quality 
assessments of identified risks? 
 
RQ9 Have evolving documentation requirements offset the efficiency gains of internal 
audit function reliance under AS5?  
 
3.3 Additional Standard-Setting Literature 
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The Board has sought to give a wide variety of stakeholders (e.g., investors, auditors, 
preparers, and academics) the opportunity to provide input on standards as they are developed 
[PCAOB 2013d]. This input-seeking methodology has allowed several academics the 
opportunity to provide both opinions on and empirical research about proposed standards. For 
example, in anticipation of AS7 concerning engagement quality reviews (EQRs) (which was 
ultimately enacted by the PCAOB in 2009), Epps and Messier [2007] analyzed the written 
guidance and practice aids of six international accounting firms to determine best practices for 
EQRs. They noted fairly consistent responses across all firms; though there were some 
noteworthy differences regarding reviewer assignment, participation, and the use of practice aids. 
Epps and Messier contended that their results provided a base for the PCAOB in setting its 
standard for EQRs. 
 Similarly, Lambert et al. [2013] explored potential, unanticipated, effects of PCAOB 
Release No. 2011-007, which discusses a potential amendment to current auditing standards that 
would require engagement partners to sign the audit report [PCAOB 2011d].. They found that 
prospective investors were less likely to invest in a peer firm linked to a restating firm via a 
shared audit partner. They contend that in an era of audit partner identity disclosure, client 
performance and event history would become inextricably linked to a partner and his/her 
reputation – eventually causing a shift in partner incentives and independence. 
Conversely, Carcello and Li [2013] examined a sample of firms in the United Kingdom 
(where engagement partner disclosure is already required) to determine the relative costs and 
benefits of such a disclosure. While they found that engagement partner disclosure was 
associated with increases in audit fees (presumably due to the increased exposure risk borne by 
audit firms), the authors also found that engagement partner disclosure was associated with 
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decreases in earnings management, increases in the issuance of qualified audit reports, and 
increases in earnings  informativeness. 
 Finally, as part of the process for obtaining feedback on proposed changes to the standard 
auditor’s report (SAR), the PCAOB surveyed professional organizations and accounting 
professionals regarding their opinions of PCAOB Release No. 2011-003. The PCAOB’s 
proposed changes would more clearly define the purpose of the SAR; and delineate the 
respective responsibilities of management and the independent auditor [PCAOB 2011c]. As a 
complement to the PCAOB’s survey, Giacomino and Akers [2012] performed a survey of 
accounting students (“future preparers and users of the financial statements”) regarding their 
opinions on the proposed changes to the SAR. While there was some level of indifference to the 
proposed PCAOB changes on the part of the students (presumably due to a lack of real-world 
experience), the authors conclude that the parties surveyed all expressed similar concerns 
regarding the potential for increased auditor liability, decreased client confidentiality, and the 
potential impairment of independence.8 
3.3.1 Future Research Opportunities  
 To date, researchers have investigated only a select few of the PCAOB’s 16 auditing 
standards. We believe that several of the PCAOB’s recent and proposed auditing standards 
present investigable topics. For example, AS8 concerns the auditor’s consideration of audit risk 
in an audit; and is qualitatively similar to the risk assessment standards adopted by the 
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) in March of 2006. While most of the international audit 
firms adopted the ASB standards, the implementation of AS8 provides an opportunity to 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that, subsequent to the publication of Giacomino and Akers’ study, the PCAOB added PCAOB 
Release No. 2013-005 (an update to PCAOB Release No. 2011-003), containing proposed standards and 
amendments, to its docket of current activities [PCAOB 2013b]. 
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examine how, and to what extent, the increased guidance provided by the PCAOB reduced audit 
risk for local and regional audit firms that are registered with the PCAOB. Were audit failure 
rates lower after the enactment of AS8? Behaviorally, or from a structured interview format, 
researchers could investigate how, if at all, these auditors changed their audit risk assessment 
process as a result of AS8.  
 We propose the following research question: 
RQ10 Were audit failure rates for local and regional audits lower following the enactment 
of AS8? 
 
4.0 INSPECTIONS 
SOX, Section 104, requires the PCAOB to inspect all registered public accounting firms 
in connection with a firm’s performance of audits, issuance of audit reports, and related matters 
involving issuers [U.S. House of Representatives 2002]. Further, if a registered firm provides 
more than 100 issuer audit reports in a given year, the PCAOB must inspect it at least annually; 
all other issuer auditors are subject to triennial inspections. The PCAOB inspects both U.S. and 
non-U.S. registered accounting firms to assess compliance with SOX, the rules of the Board, the 
rules of the SEC, and professional standards, in connection with the firm’s performance of audits 
and issuance of audit reports [PCAOB 2011e].9 During inspections, the PCAOB routinely 
evaluates the accounting firm's quality of work and examines its practices, policies, and 
procedures [PCAOB 2011e].  
                                                 
9 For foreign-based registered firms, the PCAOB’s website [http://pcaobus.org/International/Pages/default.aspx] 
states, “… non-U.S. registered firms are subject to PCAOB inspections in the same manner as U.S. firms. This often 
raises special considerations. The Board … adopted a cooperative framework that allows the PCAOB to rely … on 
inspection or enforcement work performed by a home-country regulator … By developing cooperative arrangements 
with its counterparts, the PCAOB endeavors to minimize administrative burdens and … conflicts that non-U.S. 
registered firms may face. In countries without an independent audit regulator … the PCAOB still seeks to 
coordinate with the relevant financial regulator or government ministry before commencing inspections.” 
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Figure 3 provides details on PCAOB inspections conducted since its inception.10 First, 
Panel A presents the number of audit firms inspected each year by the PCAOB from 2004-2012. 
Specifically, the first (second) [third] bar in each year is the number of annually (triennially) 
[total] inspected audit firms for said year. Panel B shows the number of issuer audits that were 
inspected from 2005-2012.11 The first (second) [third] bar in each year is the number of issuer 
inspections resulting from the inspections of annually (triennially) inspected firms.  
[Please insert Figure 3 here] 
The selection of issuer audits for review is influenced by a number of factors, including 
(1) the risk that an issuer’s financial statements could be materially misstated; (2) characteristics 
of the particular issuer or its industry; (3) the audit issues likely to be encountered; (4) 
considerations about the firm, a particular practice office or an individual partner; and (5) prior 
inspection results [PCAOB 2012a]. DeFond [2010] contended that it is important to study the 
consequences of inspections because (1) PCAOB inspections potentially impact auditors’ 
incentives, (2) the inspections are a central feature of the shift to quasi-governmental regulation 
of the U.S. auditing profession, and (3) the shift from old AICPA peer reviews to the new 
PCAOB inspections is potentially interesting because it represents a trade-off of expertise for 
independence. The reviewed literature is summarized in Table 4. 
[Please insert Table 4 here] 
4.1 Deficiency Reporting  
Anantharaman [2012] directly compared outcomes from self-regulation (i.e., peer 
reviews) and statutory regulation (i.e., PCAOB inspections) for the same group of firms. She 
                                                 
10 All totals were taken from PCAOB Annual Reports from 2004-2012. 
11 Inspection totals for 2004 were not provided in the 2004 PCAOB Annual Report, so our data is limited to the 
period from 2005-2012. 
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found that firms that chose their own peer reviewers tended to receive peer review opinions more 
favorable than their subsequent PCAOB reports, suggesting that some firms obtained ‘friendly’ 
reviews. However, reviewers with industry knowledge were less likely to give favorable reviews, 
and reviewers from the same geographic area were likely to give peer reviews that were more 
negative than the subsequent PCAOB reports.  
From a descriptive perspective, Hermanson et al. [2007] were the first to quantify 
PCAOB-identified deficiencies and trends. Examining 316 small accounting firm (i.e., those 
with 100 or fewer issuer clients) inspection reports through July 2006, the authors documented 
that 60 percent of inspected small firms had audit deficiencies, received approximately 1.6  
deficiencies per report, and had a high (70 percent) incidence of unremediated (disclosed) quality 
control criticisms. The authors noted that firms with audit deficiencies were growing more 
rapidly than firms without deficiencies, suggesting an over-extension into the issuer audit market 
by some firms or an over-extension of firm resources.  
Similarly, Church and Shefchik [2012] provided descriptive analyses of the inspection 
results for large accounting firms (i.e., those with more than 100 public clients) through 2009. 
They found that large firms experienced, on average, 14 auditing deficiencies per report, and that 
100 percent of large firms received both audit deficiencies and quality control criticisms each 
year. However, in their sample period, none of the quality control criticisms warranted public 
disclosure because firms made reasonable progress in addressing the criticisms within a 12-
month period following the report.12 The authors noted the number, as well as the severity (e.g., 
those that result in a misstatement), of PCAOB-identified auditing deficiencies had significantly 
                                                 
12 Subsequent to the Church and Shefchik [2012], two large firms (Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers) had their 
quality control criticisms released to the public. 
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decreased over time. However, the most recent report on PCAOB inspections stated that 
PCAOB-identified audit deficiencies are on the rise again [PCAOB 2012d].  
Finally, Bishop et al. [2013] examined 175 first-time and 56 second-time inspection 
reports for international firms through early 2012. The authors found that over half of the 
inspection reports identified audit deficiencies, and two-thirds cite quality control defects. 
Further, they found that (1) firms with PCAOB-identified deficiencies were smaller, but had 
more issuer clients than firms without PCAOB-identified deficiencies, (2) affiliates of Big 4 
firms were less likely to have audit deficiencies, and (3) whether the PCAOB acted alone or 
cooperated with a local regulator had no influence on inspection results. The authors cited many 
of the same issues as had been previously examined for U.S. firms (c.f., Hermanson et al. 
[2007]), in that they contended most of the identified deficiencies were the result of smaller firms 
over-extending into the issuer audit market. However, they noted that unlike U.S. firms, there 
was no difference in the rate of audit deficiencies or quality control defects for first-time versus 
second-time inspections.  
4.2 Inspection Efficacy  
Before reviewing literature that examines the effectiveness of the PCAOB inspection 
process and its reports (presented in Table 4 Panel B), it is important to understand that the goal 
of the PCAOB inspection process is to assess compliance with the standards and to improve 
actual audit quality, and not necessarily to provide informative reports to make judgments about 
quality [PCAOB 2012b]. Further, the PCAOB stresses that it is not the purpose of an inspection 
to review all of a firm's audit work or to identify every respect in which reviewed work is 
deficient, and an inspection report should not be understood to provide any assurance of the 
firm's audit work [PCAOB 2011e]. Regardless of these limitations, and interpretive value of the 
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reports, researchers have begun to investigate the efficacy of the inspection process on audit 
quality.  
Particularly, researchers have examined the effects of the inspection process in spite of 
two empirical challenges. First, the reports do not identify the issuers inspected. Second, the 
PCAOB uses a risk-based approach to select engagements for review; thus, the sample of issuers 
and identified deficiencies are not necessarily representative of the population. Given these data 
limitations, audit quality is generally not directly observable [Abbott et al. 2012], and, 
accordingly, most research examines variables that indirectly infer audit quality (e.g., auditor 
dismissals after an inspection report). For example, Lennox and Pittman [2010] examined 545 
inspection reports issued through 2007 and tested for, but found no association between, 
PCAOB-identified deficiencies and subsequent changes in clients’ audit firm choices. The 
authors contended that, due to the lack of information publicly disclosed by the PCAOB 
inspectors, less is known about audit firm quality under a PCAOB inspection regime than under 
the AICPA peer review regime (c.f., Hilary and Lennox [2005]).  
Glover et al. [2009] shared similar concerns with the efficacy of the inspection process. 
In particular, the authors contended that the inspection process is flawed for several reasons. Of 
primary concern is (1) that the public cannot easily distinguish between trivial and significant 
inspection issues, and (2) the untimely feedback provided by the inspection process. However, 
DeFond [2010] contended that simply because the inspection process fails to provide information 
value does not mean it fails to improve audit quality (or at least perceived audit quality) – a 
contention that has been supported by an increasing amount of research.  
For example, Daugherty et al. [2011], after analyzing client retention subsequent to the 
issuance of 748 inspection reports for triennially inspected firms, found that triennially inspected 
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firms with PCAOB-identified deficiencies were more likely to be involuntarily dismissed by 
their clients, and companies dismissing triennially inspected auditors were more likely to hire 
triennially inspected firms for which the PCAOB did not identify any deficiencies. Accordingly, 
they suggest that PCAOB-identified deficiencies may be costly to triennially inspected auditors.  
Similarly, Landis et al. [2011] examined 339 inspection reports of triennially inspected 
firms that contained audit deficiencies from 2005-2008; representing 1,015 audit deficiencies. 
They classified each audit deficiency according to the area and type of audit failure. A majority 
of the deficiencies were categorized into account deficiencies, which entailed inadequate 
procedures associated with certain accounts. Regarding types of audit failures, nearly 90 percent 
of the examined deficiencies were due to inadequate tests or documentation on the part of the 
auditor. The authors also noted that the number of PCAOB-identified deficiencies was higher in 
the first two years of their sample (287 and 379 deficiencies for 2005 and 2006, respectively) 
than in the last two years of their sample (149 and 200 for 2007 and 2008, respectively), 
suggesting that audit quality has improved as a result of the PCAOB inspection process. 
In another study, Abbott et al. [2012] classified inspection deficiencies into three 
categories – (1) clean, (2) GAAS-deficiencies, or (3) GAAP-deficiencies. Using a sample of all 
triennially inspected, non-foreign registered firms from 2005-2007, they found that clients of 
PCAOB-identified GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditors were more likely to dismiss 
their auditors in favor of triennially inspected auditors that were not GAAP-deficient. In 
addition, the authors found greater agency conflicts, outside blockholdings, or the presence of an 
independent and expert audit committee magnified this effect. The authors found no evidence 
that the clients used GAAP-deficient inspection reports to reduce audit fees in subsequent years. 
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More direct measures of inspection reports’ associations with audit quality have been 
examined as well. For example, Gramling et al. [2011] examined whether PCAOB-identified 
audit deficiencies were associated with a change in triennially inspected audit firms’ issuance of 
going concern opinions. The authors used Audit Analytics and inspection reports to associate the 
frequency of going concern opinions issued from 2004-2006 for 407 triennially inspected firms 
(11,879 client-year observations). They found that firms were more likely to issue going concern 
opinions subsequent to receiving an inspection report containing PCAOB-identified deficiencies. 
The authors suggested that this change in behavior was either (1) an increased willingness, 
following a PCAOB inspection, for the audit firm to “stand up to the client” and “be tough” on 
important reporting issues, and/or (2) an increased level of competence brought to the reporting 
decision.  
Gunny and Zhang [2012], used use three measures of audit quality (abnormal accruals, 
restatements, and the propensity to issue a going concern opinion), and examined the association 
between PCAOB-identified deficiencies in 527 inspection reports from 2005-2009 and audit 
quality. The authors found that triennially inspected firms whose PCAOB inspection reports 
contained serious deficiencies (i.e., auditor failed to prevent a GAAP departure) were associated 
with lower audit quality. Specifically, the authors found clients of triennially inspected auditors 
that received deficient or seriously deficient reports were associated with significantly higher 
abnormal current accruals, and clients of auditors that received a seriously deficient report were 
associated with a greater propensity to restate.  
Similarly, Carcello et al. [2011] examined Big 4 clients’ abnormal accruals after their 
audit firms’ first two inspection years (2004-2005). The authors found a significant reduction in 
abnormal accruals in the year following the first PCAOB inspection, and found a further 
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reduction in abnormal accruals in the year following the second PCAOB inspection; consistent 
with the conclusions in Landis et al. [2011]. Finally, in a recent working paper, Lamoreaux 
[2013] examined differences in audit quality for foreign registrants. Some foreign governments 
prohibit PCAOB inspections of domestic audit firms despite these firms being registered with the 
SEC. Lamoreaux used this condition to examine differences in audit quality for foreign firms 
subject to PCAOB inspections versus those that are not. He found that audit firms in countries 
subject to PCAOB inspections have a greater propensity to issue going concern opinions and 
report material weaknesses in internal controls. 
Researchers have also examined inspection perceptions from both auditors and investors. 
Daugherty and Tervo [2010] solicited perceptions of the PCAOB inspection process from 146 
partners of small (triennially inspected) firms receiving their initial inspection. They found that, 
in general, smaller respondents reported initial PCAOB inspections resulted in a negative impact 
on many aspects of their audit practices, while medium and larger firms reported more favorable 
consequences. They noted that levels of satisfaction with nearly all aspects of PCAOB 
inspections appeared to increase with firm size and the passage of time.  
Similarly, Houston and Stefaniak [2013] surveyed 107 audit partners from large public 
accounting firms and compared the inspection process to firms’ internal quality review (IQR) 
programs. They found, relative to PCAOB inspections, IQR reviewers were perceived to have a 
better understanding of firms’ audit methodologies, IQRs focused more on whether firms follow 
their methodology, and IQRs examined more audit areas. In addition, the authors found partners 
believed PCAOB inspectors were more focused on finding deficiencies than were IQR 
reviewers, and IQR feedback was more timely and helpful for improving audit quality. Finally, 
the authors found partners believed only IQRs contribute significantly to improve audit quality. 
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From an investor perspective, two studies indicated that there were market repercussions 
for PCAOB-identified deficiencies. First, Offermanns and Peek [2011] analyzed 358 inspection 
reports issued from 2005-2010, and the 7,642 related client firm-reported observations (i.e., 
financial and market price information). They found a significant market response to the 
issuances of the inspection reports, indicating that inspection reports had information content in 
the marketplace. Moreover, the authors concluded that the market response could be reliably 
attributed to the information in the inspection report, and that at least part of the market response 
to the publication of inspection reports could be attributed to revisions in investors’ perceptions 
about accounting information quality.  
 Second, Robertson and Houston [2010] conducted an experiment using 142 M.B.A. and 
E.M.B.A. students to proxy as non-professional investors, in order to investigate investors’ 
perceptions of audit opinion credibility following PCAOB inspections. They found an overall 
increase in perceptions of the credibility of future audit opinions, the degree to which perceptions 
increased was a function of (1) deficiency severity; (2) firms responding to the reports with 
concessions rather than denials; and (3) firm size. 
In summary, while some research [Glover et al. 2009; Lennox and Pittman 2010; 
Houston and Stefaniak 2013] questioned the efficacy of the inspection process, several studies 
have contributed empirical evidence to support the position that the PCAOB inspection process 
has been beneficial to the auditing profession. Specifically, the literature contends PCAOB-
identified deficiencies  resulted in market penalties for audit firms [Abbott et al. 2011; Daugherty 
2011] and, over time, the inspection process appeared to lead to improved audit quality [Carcello 
et al. 2011; Gramling et al. 2011; Gunny and Zhang 2012]. However, the degree to which this 
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improvement was perceived by auditors and investors appears to differ significantly [Robertson 
and Houston 2010; Offermanns and Peek 2011; Houston and Stefaniak 2013]. 
4.3 Future Research Opportunities 
 Though much progress has been made on understanding the effects of the PCAOB 
inspection process, we believe there are several opportunities for future research. For example, 
what are the longitudinal effects for annually inspected firms that receive improved or worsened 
inspection reports than previously received? What are the repercussions for the disclosure of Part 
II items (i.e., quality control deficiencies not remediated within 12 months)?  
While data anonymity is often cited as a hindrance for empirical research into inspection 
reports, for smaller audit firms with only a few issuer clients, issuer anonymity is diminished to 
some extent (if not completely). That is, some companies audit only one (e.g., B.F. Borgers CPA 
PC in 2012) or two (Farmer, Fuqua & Huff, P.C. in 2012) issuer clients. What are the effects of 
this reduced anonymity? Does it put these audit firms at a disadvantage? Do clients of smaller 
audit firms observe a larger contagion effect when PCAOB-identified deficiencies are released 
for their auditors? For those clients that are the only issuer of an audit firm, what are the market 
reactions to PCAOB-identified deficiencies in an inspection report that implicitly must come 
from that issuer?   
We propose the following research questions: 
RQ11 Is client retention and the acquisition of new clients associated with improvements 
or falloffs in PCAOB-identified deficiencies? 
 
RQ12 Do audit firms with unremediated audit deficiencies voluntarily deregister from 
SEC audits? 
 
RQ13 Do the clients of audit firms that only have a few public clients experience more 
severe market repercussions in response to deficiencies identified in the inspection 
reports of these auditors? 
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5.0 ENFORCEMENT 
The Board uses its investigative authority to identify serious audit deficiencies that pose 
risks to investors and uses its disciplinary authority to impose sanctions and penalties for those 
deficiencies [PCAOB 2012a]. If the board believes one or more violations have occurred, review 
of the registered public audit firm escalates from an inspection to a formal investigation. The 
PCAOB has several potential sanctions, including: suspending or revoking the accounting firm's 
PCAOB registration, suspending or barring wrongdoers from further association with any 
registered accounting firm, limiting the accounting firm's activities, and assessing civil penalties 
[PCAOB 2012a].  
Similar to SEC investigations, the PCAOB maintains some discretion with regard to its 
investigation findings. If necessary, however, SOX [U.S. House of Representatives 2002] allows 
the board to share information with the U.S. Department of Justice, certain bank regulators, state 
attorney generals, and appropriate state authorities. Once a proposed disciplinary action has been 
settled, the PCAOB publicly discloses the terms of the settlement and any associated sanctions. 
Figure 4 presents the number of investigations initiated from 2005-2010, as well as the number 
of settled disciplinary orders from 2005-2012.13   
[Please insert Figure 4 here] 
Finally, the PCAOB discloses the details of disciplinary actions that are currently under 
adjudication [PCAOB 2013e]. As of August 1, 2013, eleven disciplinary orders were under 
adjudication. 
5.1 Enforcement Research 
                                                 
13 Starting in 2011, the PCAOB stopped disclosing in its annual report the number of investigations it initiated 
during the current year. 
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To date, a modest amount of studies have examined the impact of PCAOB enforcement 
actions (presented in Table 5). Gilbertson and Herron [2009] examined all PCAOB enforcement 
actions through 2008. They identified 20 actions relating to 17 cases against 13 triennially 
inspected accounting firms, one annually inspected accounting firm, and 23 individuals. They 
examined various client and auditor characteristics involved in these cases, and found several 
commonalities. First, they found that disciplined auditors frequently had longer PCAOB reviews 
and more audit deficiencies identified in their inspection reports. Second, the auditors in these 
cases tended to audit more SEC registrants. Finally, these audit firms were often smaller, less 
financially sound, and had only a few audit partners. The authors concluded that their findings 
are fairly consistent with pre-PCAOB era literature.  
[Please insert Table 5 here] 
 Two recent studies examined the implications of PCAOB enforcement actions against 
Deloitte. Dee et al. [2010] performed a study of the events surrounding the PCAOB sanctions 
against Deloitte in late 2007 for its 2003 audit of Ligand Pharmaceuticals. This event marked the 
first time that the PCAOB levied sanctions against a Big 4 auditor. The authors examined market 
returns (measured by cumulative abnormal returns over one-, two-, and three-day windows 
following the announcement of PCAOB sanctions against Deloitte) for clients of Deloitte and the 
other three Big 4 public accounting firms. While the market returns for the clients of all of the 
Big 4 accounting firms were negative, the returns for Deloitte clients were significantly more 
negative than the rest. The authors concluded that the evidence showed that the PCAOB 
sanctions revealed value-relevant information about Deloitte’s reputation or insurance value that 
was not contained in the other Ligand events.  
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 In order to assess the effects of a Big 4 Part II disclosure, Roybark [2013] performed a 
case study over the PCAOB’s 2011 disclosure of Deloitte’s unremediated quality control issues 
from 2007. Roybark found that, in the 13-month period around the disclosure (April 1, 2011 to 
April 30, 2012), Deloitte had a greater number of auditor changes and dismissals than other Big 
4 accounting firms. Interestingly, Roybark noted Deloitte maintained its market share of audit 
fees from prior years (though the total audit fees for all Big 4 firms was lower in 2011). Perhaps 
most importantly, while the majority of Big 4 auditor changes and associated audit fees during 
this period were retained by other Big 4 audit firms (68 percent), the remaining 32 percent of 
firms that were retained by non-Big 4 firms may be cause for concern; given that smaller firms 
might not be as well equipped to deal with the increased risks associated with larger clients. 
 In an effort to determine the reasons for PCAOB sanctions against auditor EQRs, Messier 
et al. [2010] expanded upon the EQR findings of Epps and Messier [2007]. They examined 28 
sanctions against EQRs from 1993 to 2008 (including two sanctions issued under the PCAOB). 
Consistent with the findings in Gilbertson and Herron [2009], the authors found that most EQR 
sanctions were issued to smaller firms with limited partner participation. All of the cases cited a 
departure from GAAS; and 23 of the 28 cases identified a lack of due professional care on the 
part of the reviewing partner (generally referring to a lack of professional skepticism). Additional 
PCAOB-identified deficiencies related to the issuance of incomplete or inaccurate financial 
information or a lack of conformity with GAAP.  
 While the extant literature on PCAOB enforcement actions has identified several 
characteristics of audit firms that have been sanctioned, there has been little research regarding 
the implications of sanction risk. In a recent paper, Huber [2013] posited that the risk of 
sanctions by the PCAOB may be passed on to audit clients in the form of higher audit fees. 
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Huber established the legal and economic bases for PCAOB sanction risk; and called for future 
research to be performed in this area.  
5.2 Future Research Opportunities 
 Because the information available on PCAOB enforcement actions is relatively sparse, 
there is a relatively small amount of research in this area. In spite of the lack of information, 
however, it remains one of the more promising areas for future research opportunities. One 
direction for future research is reactions to PCAOB sanctions. For example, because enforcement 
actions are often associated with the audit of a particular issuer, there is a possibility that the 
market could respond negatively towards that company upon announcement of the sanction. 
Moreover, if a restatement is the catalyst/cause of an auditor sanction, the possibility exists the 
market could double penalize an issuer (i.e., the market could penalize the issuer at the time of 
the initial restatement, and then again when the auditor sanction is made public).  
 As Huber [2013] asserted, with the prospect of PCAOB sanctions comes an increased 
risk for auditors. In addition to possible monetary penalties, there is the potential that PCAOB 
sanctions could expose auditors to additional litigation risks, as confirmed by Houston and 
Stefaniak [2013]. For auditors that remained in the issuer audit market following the creation of 
the PCAOB, there is a question of whether these risks are considered in future audit pricing. One 
issue, though, would be disentangling the effects of increased auditor effort due to the PCAOB 
auditing standards and the effect of higher risk due to potential PCAOB sanctions. One 
possibility would be to explore the effects of PCAOB enforcement actions on subsequent audit 
fees. That is, do audit fees suffer from the negative publicity associated with PCAOB sanctions? 
 Finally, another potential area of consideration is the impact of different types of 
enforcement actions. In addition to possible monetary penalties, the PCAOB sanctions can bar an 
individual from working with a public accounting firm; and even censure or revoke the PCAOB 
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registration of the accounting firm. While the effect of revocation should be relatively apparent, 
other enforcement actions represent different possibilities for the future operations of sanctioned 
firms. How do clients in the public audit market perceive the various sanctions, and are their 
responses to these sanctions representative of these perceptions? 
We propose the following research questions: 
RQ14 What repercussions do clients of sanctioned auditors incur as a result of PCAOB 
sanctions? 
 
RQ15 What impact do sanctions have on audit fees in the years subsequent to a sanction? 
 
RQ16 How do clients perceive and respond to the different types of PCAOB sanctions 
against an audit firm?   
 
6.0 CONCLUSION 
 The purpose of this study was to synthesize the body of academic research on the effects 
of the PCAOB’s activities over the past decade. Specifically, we have reviewed research 
pertaining to the registration of audit firms following the creation of the PCAOB, the pros and 
cons of PCAOB standard-setting (and its effectiveness relative to prior standards), the actual and 
perceived benefits of the PCAOB inspection process, and the characteristics of firms subject to 
PCAOB enforcement actions as well as the subsequent fallout from these sanctions. Accounting 
practitioners, regulators, and academics have examined these areas at length over the past 
decade; our review yields several interesting results and implications for future research. 
 First, the prospect of more stringent oversight by the PCAOB drove many small audit 
firms out of the issuer audit market [DeFond and Lennox 2011]. The very real possibility of 
increased compliance and insurance costs, along with the presumption of stricter regulation, 
caused many firms to abandon issuer audits altogether [Read et al. 2004]. Despite the fact that 
that the PCAOB provides no representations regarding the audit quality of registered audit firms, 
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the decision to stay registered by some smaller firms (and not audit issuers) is made because of 
the belief that PCAOB registration signals higher audit quality [Read et al. 2004].  
Second, several papers have highlighted the costs and benefits of the PCAOB standard-
setting activities (e.g., Smith [2012]; Wang and Zhou [2012]). For example, while some research 
supports AS3’s increased focus on documentation (e.g., Payne and Ramsay [2008]), other 
research (e.g., Piercey [2011]) highlight unintended, adverse effects on auditor judgments (e.g., 
more lenient judgments).  
 Third, there is some contention as to whether the PCAOB inspection process yields any 
improvement in audit quality [e.g., Lennox and Pittman 2010; Glover et al. 2009]. Many 
accounting professionals contend that the peer-review and IQR processes provide consistently 
higher quality audit reviews [Gramling et al. 2010]. Moreover, several studies asserted that the 
PCAOB inspection process is more focused on identifying deficiencies in audit procedures rather 
than attempting to improve overall audit quality (e.g., Houston and Stefaniak [2013]). However, 
research also indicated that, despite providing less relevant detail than peer reviews, PCAOB 
inspections may still improve actual audit quality due to the potential regulation, litigation, and 
reputation costs associated with noncompliance [DeFond 2010]. These costs can extend to the 
marketplace; where investors may penalize firms whose auditors have been singled out by the 
PCAOB. 
Fourth, enforcement actions and subsequent penalties borne by auditors that remained in 
the issuer audit market appeared to be relatively more severe for smaller audit firms [Gilbertson 
and Herron 2009]. However, enforcement actions levied against firms of all sizes resulted in 
negative repercussions to both auditors (e.g., auditor retention) and to audit clients [Dee et al. 
2011].  
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 To date, most of the PCAOB research has focused on the inspection and standard-setting 
processes. While there are certainly additional areas for future research in these areas, we believe 
there are significant opportunities for research in the registration and enforcement areas. That is, 
because the entirety of existing registration research has focused on deregistration, there are 
several possible avenues available to examine the characteristics of auditors who register with 
the PCAOB (we note a, to-date unexplained, significant increase in registrations in 2009). This 
area is particularly relevant following the proliferation of PCAOB audit standards in the past five 
years, which (e.g., AS5) might encourage audit firms to reenter the issuer audit market.  
Regarding enforcement, this area of research becomes more accessible every year as the 
amount of information on enforcement actions by the PCAOB continues to increase. After 10 
years, we have an ever-growing dataset of sanctions against public auditors, as well as the 
underlying conditions that led to these sanctions [PCAOB 2013f]. 
[Please insert Table 6 here] 
 Our review addresses several other issues relevant to PCAOB research. Table 6 provides 
a summary of potential research questions generated within this review. These questions provide 
opportunities for future researchers that could improve our understanding of the interactions 
between the PCAOB, public accounting firms, and their clients. The findings from this research 
can have far-reaching implications for regulators and professionals, as well as academics’ 
perceptions and understanding of issuer auditing as a whole. 
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Figure 1 
Organizing Framework for Analyzing PCAOB Research 
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Figure 2 
Audit Firm Registrations with the PCAOB by Year, 2004-2012 
US, Non-US, and Total Registrants 
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Figure 3 
PCAOB Inspection Statistics 
Annually Inspected, Triennially Inspected, and Total Firms 
 
Panel A: Audit Firms Inspected by the PCAOB by Year, 2004-2012 
 
 
Panel B: Inspections Conducted by the PCAOB by Year, 2005-2012 
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Figure 4 
PCAOB Investigations Initiated and Settled by Year, 2005-2012 
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Table 1 
A Summary of Literature Concerning PCAOB Registration 
Authors and 
Date Method* 
Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Main 
Dependent 
Variable Sample Key Findings 
Read et al. 
[2004] 
A, I N/A  Auditor 
resignations 
 775 small auditor 
resignations from 2000-
2003 
 991 firms registered with 
the AICPA public 
company peer review 
program 
 47 local and regional audit firms 
disclosed in Form 8-Ks filed in 2002-
2003 that they were ceasing all SEC 
audits; while only eight such firms that 
made this disclosure in 2000-2001.  
 Interviews with partners explained that 
deregistering was the result of the 
perception of a more stringent oversight 
by the PCAOB, increased professional 
liability insurance costs, and increased 
scrutiny by the SEC. 
DeFond and 
Lennox [2011] 
A  Peer reviews 
and PCAOB 
inspections  
 Auditor 
exits from 
the public 
audit market 
 Auditor exits 
from the 
public audit 
market 
 Going 
concern audit 
opinions 
 All small audit firm exits 
(i.e., a firm that stopped 
auditing SEC registrants 
and deregistered with the 
PCAOB) from 2001 to 
2008 
 Over 600 auditors with fewer than 100 
SEC clients exited the market following 
SOX. 
 The deregistration exodus of these firms 
improved audit quality for issuers, as the 
exiting auditors were more likely to 
avoid AICPA peer reviews, fail to 
comply with PCAOB rules, and/or 
receive more severe peer review or 
inspection reports.  
 Subsequent auditors were also more 
likely to issue going concern opinions. 
* A = Archival, C = Commentary, E = Experimental, I = Interview, R = Review, S = Survey 
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Table 2 
Current and Proposed PCAOB Auditing Standards 
  
PANEL A: Current standards adopted by the PCAOB and approved by the SEC 
AS No. Title 
1 
References in Auditors’ Reports to the Standards of the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board 
3 Audit Documentation 
4 
Reporting on Whether a Previously Reported Material Weakness Continues 
to Exist 
5 
An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That Is Integrated 
with An Audit of Financial Statements 
6 Evaluating Consistency of Financial Statements 
7 Engagement Quality Review 
8 Audit Risk 
9 Audit Planning 
10 Supervision of the Audit Engagement 
11 Consideration of Materiality in Planning and Performing an Audit 
12 Identifying and Assessing Risks of Material Misstatement 
13 The Auditor's Responses to the Risks of Material Misstatement 
14 Evaluating Audit Results 
15 Audit Evidence 
16 Communications with Audit Committees 
  
PANEL B: Docket activity relating to proposed PCAOB standards 
Docket No. Title 
28 
Proposed Auditing Standard Related to Confirmation and Related 
Amendments to PCAOB Standards 
29 
Improving Transparency Through Disclosure of Engagement Partner and 
Certain Other Participants in Audits 
31 
Concept Release on Possible Rulemaking Approaches to Complement 
Application of Section 105(c)(6) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
34 
Proposed Auditing Standards on the Auditor's Report and the Auditor's 
Responsibilities Regarding Other Information and Related Amendments 
35 
Proposed Standards for Attestation Engagements Related to Broker and 
Dealer Compliance or Exemption Reports Required by the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission and Related Amendments to PCAOB Standards 
36 
Proposed Auditing Standard on Auditing Supplemental Information 
Accompanying Audited Financial Statements and Related Amendments to 
PCAOB Standards 
37 Concept Release on Auditor Independence and Audit Firm Rotation 
38 
Proposed Auditing Standard on Related Parties and Related Amendments to 
PCAOB Auditing Standards 
40 
Proposed Framework for Reorganization of PCAOB Auditing Standards and 
Related Amendments to PCAOB Auditing Standards and Rules 
  
45 
 
Table 3 
A Summary of Literature Concerning PCAOB Standard-Setting 
 
Panel A: AS2 and AS5 - Internal Controls Evaluations and Assessments 
Authors and 
Date Method* 
Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Main 
Dependent 
Variable Sample Key Findings 
Raghunandan 
and Rama 
[2006] 
A 
 Pre- v. Post-
SOX period 
 Material 
Weaknesses in 
Internal 
Controls 
 Audit Fees 
 660 manufacturing firms 
that filed SOX 404 reports 
prior to May 15, 2005 
 Audit fees were about 86% higher in the 
post-SOX period.  
 However, there was no correlation with 
the presence of reported material 
weaknesses and audit fees; or the 
frequency of occurrence of these material 
weaknesses. 
Mock et al. 
[2009] 
T 
 Auditing 
Standard-
setting 
 Risk 
Assessment  
 Efficiency 
and 
Effectiveness 
of 
Engagements 
 A Big 4 Audit Firm 
Approach to ICFR 
assessments 
 Real world internal controls over 
financial reporting (ICFR) assessment 
approaches were used to develop a 
theoretical model  
 Risk assessments based on this model 
were compared to those set forth in AS5 
to evaluate the overall effectiveness 
relative to the standard. 
Schneider et al. 
[2009] 
R N/A N/A 
 All SOX internal control 
studies through Fall 2009 
 Internal control deficiencies (ICDs) were 
associated with smaller and riskier 
companies; and with firms that had 
weaker boards, audit committees, and 
financial management.  
 ICDs tended to have negative reactions 
in the market and subsequent auditor 
judgments. 
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Authors and 
Date Method* 
Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Main 
Dependent 
Variable Sample Key Findings 
Doogar et al. 
[2010] 
A 
 Changes in 
Audit Fees 
following AS5 
 Auditee 
Fraud Risk 
 Benchmark 
Audit Fees 
for AS2 
 7,662 U.S. firm-year 
observations from 
November 2005 through 
June 2008 with data 
available in Compustat and 
Audit Analytics.  
 Additional criteria 
restricted the final sample 
to 3,023 observations. 
 Audit fees were lower overall under 
AS5.  
 However, this reduction appeared to be 
dependent on the auditor’s assessment of 
fraud risk, as clients with higher 
assessed fraud risks did not experience 
significant decreases in audit fees from 
AS5. 
Bronson et al. 
[2011] 
A 
 Timeliness  
 Reporting 
strategy  
 Reliability  
 PCAOB 
regulation 
(time series – 
before and 
after 
regulation 
enactment) 
 17,249 firm-year 
observations from 2000-
2005 with earnings 
announcement data in 
Compustat and audit report 
date data in Audit 
Analytics 
 Audit report lags increased on 10 to 15 
days on average following the enactment 
of AS2 and AS3.  
 PCAOB regulation appeared to be 
associated with a change in reporting 
strategy. 
 Earlier announcements tended to be 
more relevant, but less reliable; and 
vice-versa.  
 Firms that announced earlier in the post-
PCAOB regulation years tended to have 
less reliable preliminary earnings 
announcements. 
Krishnan et al. 
[2011] 
A 
 Enactment of 
AS5  
 Client Size 
 Client 
Complexity 
 Audit Fees 
 4,626 Compustat and Audit 
Analytics firm-year 
observations for firms that 
adopted AS5.  
 Removal of observations 
with inconsistent or 
inadequate information 
resulted in a final sample of 
3,909 observations. 
 Audit fees decreased following the 
enactment of PCAOB AS5; with larger 
decreases for companies with material 
weaknesses under AS2 receiving 
subsequent “clean” opinions under AS5.  
 Audit fee decreases benefitted firms on 
the basis of firm size.  
 Audit fee decreases appeared to be more 
pronounced for more complex firms (on 
the basis of number of segments and 
firm mergers). 
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Authors and 
Date Method* 
Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Main 
Dependent 
Variable Sample Key Findings 
Smith [2012] E 
 Bottom-up 
coverage based 
standard (AS2) 
vs.  
Top-down risk 
based standard 
(AS5) 
 Litigation 
reform 
reducing 
auditor liability 
 Perceived 
Audit 
Quality 
 Perceived 
ICFR 
Investment 
 Investment 
Allocation 
 Mock investment portfolios 
of 101 MBA students 
 Investors perceived reduced audit quality 
following the change in standards. 
 This perceived change in audit quality 
was also associated with the perception 
of a reduction in investment in internal 
controls. 
Wang and 
Zhou [2012] 
A 
 Pre- and post-
AS5 period 
 Audit Fees  
 Audit 
Quality 
 All firms in Audit 
Analytics internal control 
file database as of August 
15, 2008; cross-referenced 
with Compustat financial 
variables.  
 The sample was 
segregated into two control 
samples (prior to the 
implementation of AS5) 
and a testing sample (after 
the implementation of 
AS5). 
 Overall audit fees decreased following 
the implementation of AS5.  
 However, there was no evidence of a 
corresponding decrease in audit quality 
(using abnormal accruals and meet or 
beat analysts' forecasts as measures of 
audit quality); indicating that AS5 was 
successful in its objective. 
Bame-Aldred 
et al. [2013] 
R N/A N/A 
 All post-SOX research on 
external auditor (EA) 
reliance on the internal 
audit function (IAF) 
through Spring 2013 
 The EA reliance decision is a complex 
one.  
 The high judgment environment dictates 
that reliance decisions vary from 
engagement to engagement.  
 Despite the current relevance of EA 
reliance on IAF, there has been little 
research performed regarding how this 
relationship affects audit quality. 
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Authors and 
Date Method* 
Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Main 
Dependent 
Variable Sample Key Findings 
Schroeder and 
Hogan [2013] 
A 
  Financial Risk 
 Audit Risk 
 Auditor 
Business Risk 
 Auditor-Client 
Misalignment 
 Changes to 
Big 4 client 
portfolios 
 Auditor data from Audit 
Analytics and client data 
from Compustat; 2002-
2009 (recession period is 
identified as 11/15/2007 
through 2009) 
 While clients shifted between Big 4 and 
non-Big 4 audit firms throughout the 
sample period, the incidence of shifting 
from Big to non-Big 4 was lower during 
the recession/AS5 period. 
 Despite taking on new high-risk clients, 
Big 4 firms “balanced” their client 
portfolios by leaving existing high-risk 
clients; leading to lower overall audit 
risk levels in the recession/AS5 period. 
* A = Archival, C = Commentary, E = Experimental, I = Interview, R = Review, S = Survey 
Panel B: AS3 - Audit Documentation and Associated Risk Assessment 
Authors and 
Date Method* 
Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Main 
Dependent 
Variable Sample Key Findings 
Payne and 
Ramsay [2008] 
E, S 
 Stage 1: 
Documentation 
Method 
 Stage 2: 
Number of 
times evidence 
is examined, 
Amount of time 
spent 
examining 
evidence 
 Stage 1: 
Number of 
times 
evidence is 
examined, 
Amount of 
time spent 
examining 
evidence 
 Stage 2: 
Number of 
errors 
identified, 
Pattern 
recognition, 
Memory of 
the evidence 
 286 surveys of staff- and 
senior-level auditors from 
three of the Big 5 public 
accounting firms.  
 After removing unusable 
responses from the sample, 
the final sample size was 
211. 
 In the first stage, auditors reviewed 
evidence items more frequently when 
using summary memos, but spent more 
time examining the evidence when using 
detailed testing.  
 In the second stage, frequency was 
associated with better evidence memory; 
while duration was associated with better 
error recognition. 
 Both frequency and duration were 
associated with pattern recognition, 
though duration was far more significant.  
 The increased duration associated with 
detailed workpapers appeared to also 
improve pattern recognition at the 
reviewer level. 
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Authors and 
Date Method* 
Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Main 
Dependent 
Variable Sample Key Findings 
Piercey [2011] E 
 Documentation 
Requirements 
 Audit Risk 
Assessments 
 Audit risk assessment task 
assigned to 138 auditors 
from two large public 
accounting firms and 76 
accounting students 
 While increased documentation provided 
more detail, this detail was generally 
qualitative justification for the auditor’s 
position.  
 The perceived review risk was lower, but 
the judgment on the part of the auditor 
was not any more critical than before. 
 Ironically, this resulted in more lenient 
overall audit risk assessments. 
* A = Archival, C = Commentary, E = Experimental, I = Interview, R = Review, S = Survey 
Panel C: Additional Standard-Setting Literature 
Authors and 
Date Method* 
Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Main 
Dependent 
Variable Sample Key Findings 
Epps and 
Messier [2007] 
E, S N/A N/A 
 Questionnaires distributed 
to six international 
accounting firms (Big 4 
and two of the three next 
largest firms) 
 Based on a survey of engagement quality 
(EQ) reviews in the largest audit firms, 
the study found some significant 
differences in the areas of reviewer 
assignment, participation, and the use of 
practice aids. 
Glover et al. 
[2009] 
C N/A N/A N/A 
 The authors asserted that the Board’s 
ability to achieve its mission was limited 
by its early choices, together with its 
incentives, organizational composition, 
and structure.  
 They also presented high-level 
recommendations for change for policy 
makers, regulators, and leaders in the 
profession to consider in developing 
improved approaches to audit standard-
setting, inspection, and enforcement. 
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Authors and 
Date Method* 
Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Main 
Dependent 
Variable Sample Key Findings 
Giacomino and 
Akers [2012] 
S N/A N/A 
 Surveys from 79 Business 
students at a private 
Midwestern university 
 Student survey responses to proposed 
changes in the standard auditor’s report 
were quantitatively similar to the 
responses of accounting professionals 
and organizations. 
Carcello and Li 
[2013] 
A 
 Engagement 
partner 
signatures on 
audit reports 
 Audit quality 
 Audit fees 
 All Datastream records for 
UK companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange 
from 2008-2010 
 Mandatory disclosure of the engagement 
partner on the audit report was 
associated with higher audit fees. 
 However, such disclosures were also 
associated with reduced earnings 
management, more qualified opinions, 
and higher overall earnings 
informativeness. 
Lambert et al. 
[2013] 
E, S 
 Audit Partner 
Disclosure  
 Modified Audit 
Report 
 Partner-Based 
Information 
Transfer 
(“contagion 
effect”) 
 380 individuals with 
investment experience 
 Audit partner disclosure was associated 
with a lower propensity to invest in firms 
that shared an audit partner with a 
restating firm (versus firms that only 
shared a common audit firm).  
 This reduced propensity to invest was 
not improved by modified audit report 
language indicating that audit opinions 
represented the audit firm as a whole. 
* A = Archival, C = Commentary, E = Experimental, I = Interview, R = Review, S = Survey 
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Table 4 
A Summary of Literature Concerning PCAOB Inspections 
Panel A: Deficiency Reporting 
Authors and 
Date Method* 
Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Main 
Dependent 
Variable Sample Key Findings 
Hermanson et 
al. [2007] 
R N/A 
 Inspection 
findings 
 316 PCAOB small firm 
inspection reports through 
2006 
 The authors found that 60 percent of the 
inspected firms had audit deficiencies.  
 Firms with audit deficiencies were 
smaller, had a larger number of issuer 
clients, and were growing more rapidly 
than firms without deficiencies, 
suggesting an over extension into the 
issuer client market by some firms. 
DeFond [2010] C N/A N/A N/A 
 The author attempted to place the 
PCAOB’s investigations into the broader 
auditing and regulatory literature, 
critiqued what we learn and do not learn 
from their analysis, and made 
suggestions for future related research. 
Anantharaman 
[2012] 
A 
 Peer reviews 
and PCAOB 
inspection 
reports 
 Review or 
Inspection 
outcome 
 407 firms’ last peer review 
and first PCAOB 
inspection report 
 The author found that firms that chose 
their own reviewers tended to receive 
peer review opinions more favorable than 
their subsequent PCAOB reports.  
 On the other hand, reviewers with 
relevant industry knowledge were less 
likely to give such favorable reviews.  
 Further, reviewers from the same 
geographic area were likely to give peer 
reviews that were more negative than the 
subsequent PCAOB reports. 
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Authors and 
Date Method* 
Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Main 
Dependent 
Variable Sample Key Findings 
Church and 
Shefchik 
[2012] 
R N/A 
 Inspection 
results 
 All 2004-2009 large firm 
inspection reports 
 The authors documented a significant, 
downward linear trend in the number of 
deficiencies from 2004 to 2009 
 They also identified common, recurring 
audit deficiencies, determined the 
financial statement accounts most often 
impacted by audit deficiencies, and 
isolated the primary emphasis of the 
financial statement impacted. 
Bishop et al. 
[2013] 
R N/A 
 Inspection 
results 
 175 first-time and 56 
second-time inspection 
reports for international 
firms issued through 
February 4, 2012 
 The authors found that just over half of 
the inspection reports identified audit 
deficiencies, and two-thirds cited quality 
control defects.  
 Deficiency firms were smaller, but had 
more issuer clients than no-deficiency 
firms, reflecting possible over-extension 
into the issuer audit market. 
 They also found no significant 
differences in the rate of audit 
deficiencies or quality control defects 
based on whether the PCAOB acted 
alone or cooperated with a local regulator 
in conducting the inspection, or based on 
the home country’s legal tradition. 
* A = Archival, C = Commentary, E = Experimental, I = Interview, R = Review, S = Survey 
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Panel B: Inspection Efficacy 
Authors and 
Date Method* 
Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Main 
Dependent 
Variable Sample Key Findings 
Glover et al. 
[2009] 
C N/A N/A N/A 
 The authors asserted that the Board’s 
ability to achieve its mission was limited 
by its early choices, together with its 
incentives, organizational composition, 
and structure.  
 They also presented high-level 
recommendations for change for policy 
makers, regulators, and leaders in the 
profession to consider in developing 
improved approaches to audit standard-
setting, inspection, and enforcement. 
Daugherty and 
Tervo [2010] 
S N/A 
 Small firm 
perceptions of 
the PCAOB 
inspection 
process 
 146 leaders of small 
registered public 
accounting firms 
 
 
 
 In general, smaller respondents reported 
initial PCAOB inspections resulted in a 
negative impact on many aspects of their 
audit practices, while medium and larger 
firms reported more favorable 
consequences.  
 Collectively, responding firms evaluated 
their initial inspection team’s 
performance favorably, but were more 
critical of other aspects of the inspection 
process.  
 Levels of satisfaction with nearly all 
aspects of PCAOB inspections appeared 
to increase with firm size and the passage 
of time. 
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Authors and 
Date Method* 
Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Main 
Dependent 
Variable Sample Key Findings 
Lennox and 
Pittman [2010] 
A 
 Prior peer 
review report 
opinion 
 PCAOB 
inspections 
 Change in 
number of 
audit clients 
 PCAOB 
inspections 
 Audit firm 
exits from 
the public 
market 
 Audit 
deficiencies 
identified in 
PCAOB 
inspection 
reports 
 [Parts 1 and 2] 545 
PCAOB inspection reports 
through December 31, 
2007; 1001 peer review 
reports between 1997 and 
2003 
 [Part 3] 545 PCAOB 
inspection reports through 
December 31, 2007; 
Auditor change data in 
Auditor-Trak and Audit 
Analytics from 2007 to 
2008 
 PCAOB inspections have not been 
perceived as influencing audit quality or 
client retention.  
 However, the new inspections standards 
have caused a number of smaller audit 
firms to exit the public audit market.  
 Taken as a whole, it was inconclusive 
whether the PCAOB had an effect on 
audit quality. 
Carcello et al. 
[2011] 
A 
 Years 
subsequent to 
the first two 
PCAOB 
inspections 
 Changes in 
audit quality 
(abnormal 
accruals) 
 Changes in abnormal 
accruals between 2004 and 
2006 for 4,719 Big 4 
auditee-years 
 The authors found a significant reduction 
in abnormal accruals in the year 
following the first PCAOB inspection  
 They found a further reduction in 
abnormal accruals in the year following 
the second PCAOB inspection. 
Daugherty et 
al. [2011] 
A 
 Deficiency 
type and 
quality 
control issues 
 Voluntary 
and 
involuntary 
client loss 
 748 inspections performed 
on triennially inspected 
auditors for reports 
released from 2005-2008 
 The authors found deficiency reports 
were associated with triennially 
inspected auditors being involuntarily 
dismissed by their clients, and companies 
that dismissed triennially inspected 
auditors were more likely to hire 
triennially inspected auditors without 
deficiency reports.  
 Also, deficiency reports were associated 
with triennially inspected auditors 
voluntarily resigning from their publicly 
traded clients, and ceasing to be 
registered with the PCAOB. 
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Authors and 
Date Method* 
Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Main 
Dependent 
Variable Sample Key Findings 
Gramling et al. 
[2011] 
A 
 Inspection 
deficiencies 
 Change in 
going 
concern 
reporting 
decisions 
 407 triennially inspected 
firms (11,879 client-year 
observations) from 2004-
2006 
 The authors’ analysis generally indicated 
that firms with PCAOB deficiencies were 
more likely to issue a GC opinion for 
financially distressed clients subsequent 
to their PCAOB inspection than prior to 
their inspection. 
Landis et al. 
[2011] 
A N/A 
 Inspection 
deficiencies 
by area 
 Inspection 
deficiencies 
by failure 
type 
 339 inspection reports of 
triennially inspected firms 
from 2005  to 2008 that 
contained audit 
deficiencies  
 A majority of the deficiencies by area 
were identified as inadequate procedures 
associated with certain accounts. 
 Nearly 90 percent of the examined 
deficiencies by failure type were due to 
inadequate tests or documentation on the 
part of the auditor. 
Offermanns 
and Peek 
[2011] 
A 
 Inspection 
deficiencies 
 Audit quality 
 224 first-round and 134 
second-round inspection 
reports between January 
2005 and March 2010 
 The authors found a statistically and 
economically significant market response 
to the issuances inspection reports.  
 The authors also found that at least part 
of the market response to the publication 
of PCAOB inspection reports can be 
attributed to revisions in investors’ 
beliefs about accounting information 
quality. 
Abbott et al. 
[2012] 
A 
 Clean, 
GAAS-
Deficient, or 
GAAP-
Deficient 
PCAOB 
inspection 
reports for 
triennially 
inspected 
firms 
 Auditor 
dismissals 
 521 triennially inspected 
nonforeign accounting 
firm PCAOB inspection 
reports filed from Jan. 21, 
2005 to Dec. 31, 2007, of 
which 256 (49.1%) were 
clean, and 61 (11.7%) 
were GAAP-deficient 
 Results suggested that the clients of 
GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected 
auditors were more likely to dismiss 
these auditors in favor of triennially 
inspected auditors that were not GAAP-
deficient.  
 The authors also found that greater 
agency conflicts, the presence of an 
independent and expert audit committee, 
and outside blockholdings magnified the 
effect. 
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Authors and 
Date Method* 
Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Main 
Dependent 
Variable Sample Key Findings 
Gunny and 
Zhang [2012] 
A 
 Inspection 
deficiencies 
 Audit quality 
(abnormal 
accruals, 
restatements, 
and the 
propensity to 
issue a going 
concern 
opinion) 
 527 triennially inspected 
firm inspection reports 
from 2005-2009 
 The authors found that PCAOB 
inspections were associated with lower 
audit quality when the reports were 
seriously deficient.  
 More specifically, they found clients of 
triennially inspected auditors that receive 
a deficient or seriously deficient report 
were associated with significantly higher 
abnormal current accruals and clients of 
auditors that received a seriously 
deficient report were associated with a 
greater propensity to restate. 
Houston and 
Stefaniak 
[2013] 
S N/A 
 Large firm 
partner 
perceptions 
of PCAOB 
inspection 
and Internal 
Quality 
Review 
(IQR) 
processes 
 107 audit partners from 
large public accounting 
firms 
 A majority of partners predicted the year 
of both reviews and perceived that, 
relative to PCAOB inspections, IQR 
reviewers had a better understanding of 
firms’ audit methodologies, IQRs 
focused more on whether firms followed 
their methodology, and IQRs examined 
more audit areas.  
 In addition, partners believed that 
PCAOB inspectors were more focused 
on finding deficiencies than were IQR 
reviewers, and that IQR feedback was 
more timely and helpful for improving 
audit quality.  
 Both reviews were perceived to impact 
professional reputation; however, 
partners perceived that PCAOB 
inspections increased their firms’ 
litigation risk more so than did IQRs. 
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Authors and 
Date Method* 
Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Main 
Dependent 
Variable Sample Key Findings 
Lamoreaux 
[2013] 
A 
 PCAOB 
inspection 
exposure 
 Going 
concern 
opinions 
 Reports of 
material 
weaknesses 
 4,670 firm-year 
observations from 2001-
2010 of foreign firms 
listed in the United States 
 Audit firms in jurisdictions that are 
subject to the PCAOB inspection process 
tended to issue more going concern 
opinions and report more material 
weaknesses in internal controls. 
Robertson and 
Houston 
[2010] 
E 
 Deficiency 
severity and 
firm response 
 Investor 
perception of 
future audit 
credibility 
 142 M.B.A. and E.M.B.A. 
students to proxy as non-
professional investors 
 While the authors found an overall 
increase in perceptions of the credibility 
of future audit opinions, the degree to 
which perceptions increase was a 
function of three salient characteristics of 
PCAOB reports: (1) inspections 
contained high (low) severity 
deficiencies; (2) firms responded to the 
reports with concessions (denials); and 
(3) for small (large) firms. 
* A = Archival, C = Commentary, E = Experimental, I = Interview, R = Review, S = Survey 
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Table 5 
A Summary of Literature Concerning PCAOB Enforcement Actions 
Authors and 
Date Method* 
Main 
Independent 
Variables 
Main 
Dependent 
Variable Sample Key Findings 
Gilbertson and 
Herron [2009] 
R N/A N/A 
 17 PCAOB enforcement 
actions issued through 2008 
 Firms that were disciplined by the 
PCAOB had longer reviews and more 
identified deficiencies.  
 These firms tended to be smaller and less 
financially sound audit firms with fewer 
partners. 
Dee et al. 
[2011] 
A 
 Deloitte 
client vs. 
non-Deloitte 
client 
 Cumulative 
abnormal 
returns 
 Big 4 auditor clients as of 
the event date (December 
10, 2007 - the 
announcement of PCAOB 
sanctions against Deloitte) 
in Audit Analytics  
 All Big 4 clients experienced negative 
returns during the event window, but that 
the returns for Deloitte clients were 
significantly more negative. 
Messier et al. 
[2010] 
A 
 GAAS/ 
GAAP 
Violations 
identified by 
the SEC/ 
PCAOB 
 Engagement 
Quality 
Reviewer 
(EQR) 
Sanctions 
 28 cases of sanctions 
against EQRs between 
1993 and 2008 
 Less than 30% of the sanctions in the 
sample were levied against Big 4/Big 5 
accounting firms.  
 Most of the identified deficiencies related 
to a lack of due professional care on the 
part of the reviewer; by and large 
referring to a lack of professional 
skepticism. 
 Additional deficiencies identified related 
to the issuance of incomplete or 
inaccurate financial information or a lack 
of conformity with GAAP.  
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Huber [2013] C N/A N/A N/A 
 The risk of sanctions by the PCAOB may 
be passed on to audit clients in the form 
of higher audit fees.  
 More research needs to be done on this 
subject. 
Roybark 
[2013] 
A N/A N/A 
 The disclosure of the 
nonpublic sections of the 
PCAOB’s 2007 inspection 
of Deloitte 
 Deloitte experienced a greater number of 
auditor changes and dismissals in the 13-
month period surrounding the disclosure. 
 The auditor switches from Big 4 to non-
Big 4 firms during this period may be 
cause for concern, as the smaller auditors 
may not be capable of handling the 
heightened risks associated with handling 
larger clients. 
* A = Archival, C = Commentary, E = Experimental, I = Interview, R = Review, S = Survey 
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Table 6 
Summary of Future Research Questions 
 
Registration 
RQ1:  How does PCAOB registration affect external stakeholder perceptions? 
RQ2:  Do non-public audit clients interpret PCAOB registration to be a signal of higher audit 
quality? 
RQ3:  Do audit firms that routinely submit special reports to the PCAOB (i.e., Form 3) have 
higher/lower audit quality than firms that do not? 
RQ4:  What led to the sharp increase in PCAOB registrations in 2009? 
Standard-Setting 
AS2 and AS5 - Internal Controls Evaluations and Assessments 
RQ5:  Did audit firms that deregistered from SEC audits following the passage of AS2 
reregister for SEC audits following the passage of AS5? 
AS3 - Audit Documentation and Associated Risk Assessment 
RQ6: What is the relationship between increased documentation under AS3 and audit 
planning decisions? 
RQ7: Do clients perceive documentation requirements under AS3 differently than they did 
prior to AS3? 
RQ8: Does the quantification of risks under AS3 result in lower or higher quality assessments 
of identified risks? 
RQ9: Have evolving documentation requirements offset the efficiency gains of internal audit 
function reliance under AS5? 
Additional Standard-Setting Literature 
RQ10: Were audit failure rates for local and regional audits lower following the enactment of 
AS8? 
Inspections 
RQ11: Is client retention and the acquisition of new clients associated with improvements or 
falloffs in PCAOB-identified deficiencies? 
RQ12: Do audit firms with unremediated audit deficiencies voluntarily deregister from SEC 
audits? 
RQ13: Do the clients of audit firms that only have a few public clients experience more severe 
market repercussions in response to deficiencies identified in the inspection reports of 
these auditors? 
Enforcement 
RQ14: What repercussions do clients of sanctioned auditors incur as a result of PCAOB 
sanctions? 
RQ15: What impact do sanctions have on audit fees in the years subsequent to a sanction? 
RQ16: How do clients perceive and respond to the different types of PCAOB sanctions 
against an audit firm?   
 
